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Abstract 
The bow tie risk analysis method is growing in its application as it is a powerful tool for visually 
communicating major accident risks and the barriers deployed to prevent or mitigate these. The 
ease of communication can mislead users to think that bow tie creation is also easy. A new CCPS 
Concept Book, Bow Ties in Risk Management, thoroughly reviews how to create bow ties and 
provides detailed guidance on how to avoid errors. 
This paper provides several examples of common errors seen in the current bow ties. These cover 
structural errors, such as degradation factors and controls are misplaced onto main pathways, 
barriers that do not comply with guidance on required barrier core attributes, and incorrect hazards, 
top events, and consequences. The paper also covers a better means to treat human error.  
A final part of the paper presents a novel multi-level approach to bow ties that can be helpful for 
human error and mechanical integrity applications where deeper degradation controls are 
important to display. 
Abbreviations 
CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety 
EI Energy Institute 
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study 
HOF Human and Organizational Factors 
LOTO Lock Out Tag Out 
 
Introduction 
Bow tie analysis has been used for many years and is growing in its application as it is a powerful 
tool for visually communicating major accident risks and the barriers deployed to prevent or 
mitigate these. The ease of communication can mislead users to think that bow tie creation is also 
easy, and this is not the case. The method is qualitative and uses a diagrammatic representation of 
major accident threat and consequence pathways showing the hazard, top event, threats and 
consequences, with intervening barriers and degradation factor pathways linked to the main 
pathway barriers. A unique feature of the bow tie is its ability to communicate complex major 
hazard events in a simple format that is easily communicated to all members of staff, contractors, 
regulators and other stakeholders. Bow ties require a significant effort to create and update as 
necessary. A new CCPS Concept Book (CCPS & EI, 2018) thoroughly reviews creation of bow 
ties and provides detailed guidance on avoiding errors. 
One of the primary goals of the book is to ensure consistent application of the bow tie technique 
by defining structural elements together with good and poor examples for clarification. An issue 
with bow ties is that there is no widely accepted methodology or definitions and this has resulted 
in many inconsistencies, poor structures, and poor treatment of human and organizational factors. 
CCPS along with the Energy Institute, collaborated to provide a book that compiles current 
practices and provided a set of suggested approaches. 
The basic bow tie is shown in Figure 1. The figure shows the 8 main bow ties elements: 1) hazard, 
2) top event, 3) consequence, 4) threat, 5) prevention barrier, 6) mitigation barrier, 7) degradation 
factor, and 8) degradation control.   
 
Figure 1. Basic Bow Tie 
Common Errors: Hazard and Top Event 
Hazard 
Hazard is defined in the book as an operation, activity or material with the potential to 
cause harm. It appears at the top of the bow tie diagram and is the source of the risk. It is important 
that the hazard is defined properly as this is the basis for the entire bow tie diagram. Generic 
hazards can lead to generic bow ties and lack the necessary detail.  
A common error of bow tie is a hazard that is too vague. For example, specifying ‘Chlorine’ alone 
as the hazard would be too generic of a description. A better example would be ‘Chlorine stored 
in a tank’ as in Figure 2. Hazards should be formulated in a controlled state and not the loss of 
control of the hazard (this is the top event) or the actual harm (the consequences). CCPS/EI suggest 
the reader ask “Is the hazard as described part of our normal business?”  
 
Figure 2. Example Hazard 
Another common error is a hazard that does not link to the consequences listed. It is important to 
include enough detail in the hazard box to ensure the correct consequences are listed. The hazard 
box on the bow tie diagram cannot show all the details of the hazard but the specifics should be 
documented. The common theme from the CCPS/EI book is that the hazard should be defined as 
specific as possible and ensure that it links to the Top Event. 
The book provides a table of well-defined and poorly defined hazards. A few examples are given 
in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Well-defined and Poorly-defined Hazards (CCPS/EI 2018) 
Hazard Commentary 
Working at height (>2m) on formwork Working at height is a common hazard and 
specifying the height provides additional 
detail. 
Pressurized propane storage in sphere The normal operational state is defined and 
some context of the volume is indicated. 
H2S The hazard does not properly set the scope 
nor identify the scenario that will be analyzed. 
The bow tie will be different depending on 
the controlled state of the H2S (e.g. drilling 
into formation containing H2S, smelting iron 
with H2S as by-product, or working in sewers 
where H2S is present). 
Control System Failure This can be a top event, threat or a barrier 
failure depending on the context. It does not 
specify the actual hazard – perhaps 
‘hydrocarbons in formation’. 
Top Event 
The top event is the moment when control over the hazard or its containment is lost. Common 
generic top events include loss of containment, loss of separation, loss of stability or loss of control. 
The top event should be linked to the hazard. If the hazard is gasoline stored in tank and good 
example for top event could be tank overflow.  
The top event should not be a consequence (e.g. explosion). A common error in defining a top 
event is to choose a consequence with damage or harm rather than a loss of control event. CCPS 
& EI (2018) recommend asking the question, “Is this loss of control or is this a consequence?” 
Another common error is choosing a top event that is part of an event sequence (e.g. ignition).  
Good practice is to define a top event where multiple threats and consequences can be identified. 
If the top event is too narrow you run the risk of needing several diagrams to cover the risks 
surrounding your asset or operations. On the contrast, the top event should not be too broad. 
Building more than ten threats and consequences for a single top event could be too broad. The 
balance between detail and economy should be influenced by the intended audience, the objective 
of the study or historical incidents.  
Common Errors: Consequence and Threat 
Consequence 
After defining the top event, the next step is to determine the consequences. A common mistake 
is defining treats before consequences since this would be the natural progression given the way 
the bow tie is drawn.  The book suggests defining consequences before threats as this will help the 
team later define only the threats that acting on the hazard can lead to significant consequences. 
Consequences are unwanted outcomes that could result from the top event and lead to damage or 
harm.  
CCPS & EI (2018) suggest describing the consequence as ‘[Damage] due to [Event]’. By 
describing the consequence this way, different barriers can be required to stop or mitigate damage 
depending on the event leading to the damage. For example, ‘fatalities due to fire’ might call for 
different mitigation barriers than ‘fatalities due to toxic gas’.  Consequences can be chosen which 
are good or poor, but generally selecting consequences is less prone to error than some other bow 
tie elements. Table 2 provides a few examples of poorly worded consequences.  
Table 2. Common Consequence Errors 
 
Threat 
Threats are possible initiating events that can result in a loss of control or containment of a hazard. 
The threat must lead to the top event if the pathway is not prevented. Three categories are helpful 
to initiate discussion in identifying threats: 
1. primary equipment not performing within normal operating limits (mechanical fault), 
2. environmental influence (overpressure due to solar heating of blocked in pipeline), 
3. operational issues (insufficient personnel present to support all required human barriers 
during start-up). 
Using ‘human error’ as a threat is not recommended by CCPS/EI as this commonly leads to 
structural errors in the bow tie. A structural error in a bow tie means that some important rule for 
bow tie construction has been violated. This is topic is elaborated more in a later section of the 
paper.  
A frequent mistake is to exclude threats that will rarely lead to the top event because of the 
argument that there are already many prevention barriers in place to control this threat. Every 
credible threat should be added to facilitate decisions as to whether there are enough prevention 
barriers in place to control the particular threat and visualizing the credible threats enables a more 
complete overview. Threats should have a direct causation and be specific. Identifying direct 
threats will often result in inclusion of more specific barriers compared to indirect threats. They 
should also be sufficient and not barrier failures. If a threat can only cause the tope event in 
combination with another threat, it is not sufficient and therefore incorrect. Table 3 provides a few 
examples of poorly worded threats.  
Table 3. Common Threat Errors 
 
Common Errors: Barriers 
The most common error often found on a bow tie diagram is with barriers. CCPS & EI define 
barrier as a control measure or grouping of control elements that on its own can prevent a threat 
developing into a top event (prevention barrier) or can mitigate the consequences of a top event 
once it has occurred (mitigation barrier). A barrier must be effective, independent, and auditable.  
This provides confidence that it will be able to act when required and as intended, without any 
action or intervention external to the barrier, and that its degradation will be prevented. The book 
differentiates between barriers and degradation controls. Barriers appear on the main pathway 
(threat to top event or top event to consequence) and degradation controls only appear on 
degradation pathways and serve to support main pathway barriers against degradation. The biggest 
mistake found on bow tie diagrams is mistaking degradation controls as barriers. For example, 
training and competence are not barriers but are however degradation controls. Training 
competence may support a particular barrier but are not capable of preventing a top event or 
mitigating the consequences. Effective, independent and auditable are explored furthered in the 
next sections.  
Effective 
A barrier is effective is it performs the intended function when demanded and to the standard 
intended. A common mistake when representing effective barriers on a bow tie include identifying 
incomplete barriers, like fire and gas detection. While these are important barriers they rely on 
other elements to completely stop the scenario from developing further. The book suggests a 
complete barrier could be fire and gas detection, automatic logic controller (or human response to 
alarm) and ESD.   
Independent 
Barriers should be independent of the threat and or other barriers on that pathway. For example, if 
the threat is loss of power a barrier requiring power to operate would not be permissible. The 
barrier is not independent of the threat. Also, it is important that there is as little common mode 
failure between barriers as possible. It is often difficult to find barriers that have no common mode 
and for this reason it is not necessary to remove barriers with some minor aspect of common mode. 
The book suggests managing the risk of a plausible common mode failure by the adding other 
barriers that do not have that common mode. Adding different types of barriers is advisable and 
usually can help avoid some general common mode failures.  
Auditable  
Barriers should be capable of being audited to check that they work when called upon.   
The most common mistakes regarding barriers are: 
 displaying multiple barriers that are actually elements of a single barrier; 
 barrier titles that are not informative; 
 placing barriers on the wrong side of the top event; and 
 indicating measures which are not barriers. 
The figures below are further examples of common errors and remedies. 
 
 
Threat and barrier are 
not independent 
 
HAZOP study is not a 
barrier 
Figure 3. Incorrect Barrier Examples 
 
 
Figure 4. Better Barrier Examples 
 
 
Figure 5. Incorrect and Better Barrier Examples 
In summary, the list below provides some dos and don’ts regarding barriers on the bow tie diagram:  
 Effective / Independent / Auditable 
 If active – must display all elements of Detect – Decide – Act 
 Should not be degradation controls 
 If prevention side – must be able to stop Top Event 
 If Mitigation side – must significantly mitigate consequence 
 A procedure is NOT a barrier, but an operator executing a procedure is 
 Similarly, a warning sign is not a barrier 
 Systems are usually not barriers 
 Inspection and Maintenance are usually not barriers 
 Lock out tag out (LOTO) and Work Permit are usually not barriers 
 HAZOP review is not a barrier 
 A trivial control is not a barrier 
Treatment of Human Error in Bow Ties 
The CCPS and the Energy Institute recognized the need to address the current inconsistencies in 
the treatment of Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) in bow ties as this could significantly 
improve process safety.  In bow ties, HOF issues can appear in several places. Humans (including 
human failure – error or inaction) can be modeled a threat, but more often appear either i) as part(s) 
of a prevention or mitigation barrier, ii) as a degradation factor, or iii) as part(s) of a degradation 
factor control. Therefore, humans can form a barrier or a barrier element. Since a human barrier is 
always active, it must have all elements of ‘detect-decide-act’ present (CCPS & EI, 2018). 
The term ‘human error’ has sometimes been used as a main pathway threat. However, the required 
barriers can be very different based on the type of human error and the context in which it might 
occur. Degradation controls against a slip (e.g., fatigue management) would be different to a 
mistake (e.g., refresher training). The term ‘human error’ is usually too imprecise to be a good 
main pathway threat - it should appear as a specific degradation factor linking through the 
degradation pathway to a main pathway barrier. The book recommends that human failure should 
not be used as a main pathway threat. Making human error a threat almost always results in 
structural errors to bow ties; mainly barriers that do not meet the validity criteria.  
CCPS & EI (2018) found many organizations developed bow ties where HOFs were represented 
as a threat for a main pathway. For example, part a of Figure 6 shows adding catalyst to an 
exothermic reactor before proper mixing is established can lead to a runaway reaction and an 
explosion.  Treating human error as a threat results in an incorrect analysis because: 
1. The HOF fails to meet the definition of a threat as it lacks the ability to combine with the 
hazard to lead to a top event. 
2. The resulting barriers “Training” and “Supervision” on the main pathway fail to meet the 
definition of barriers as they lack the ability on their own to prevent a threat developing 
into a top event and cannot detect-decide-act. 
3. The resulting four barriers on the main pathway lead to overconfidence in control over the 
threat. 
 
a) Poor Treatment 
 
b) Better Treatment 
 
 
Figure 6. Example 1 Poor and Better Treatment of Human Error in Bow Tie 
Treating human error as a degradation factor for a main pathway barrier is shown in part b of 
Figure 6 which results in a correct analysis because: 
1. The HOF “Operator error startup procedure” as a degradation factor for the barrier 
“Operator follows catalyst loading procedure” meets the definition of being a situation, 
condition, defect, or error that compromises the function of a main pathway barrier, either 
through degrading it or reducing its effectiveness. 
2. The resulting barriers “Training” and “Supervision” on the degradation factor pathway 
meet the definition of safeguards as they support the main pathway barrier and lie along 
degradation pathways into that barrier where they help defeat the degradation factor. 
3. The resulting barrier “catalyst injection interlocked to mixer status” on the main pathway 
more correctly represent the control over the threat and the resulting four safeguards on the 
degradation pathway more correctly represent the level of attention paid to maintaining the 
barrier “Operator follows catalyst loading procedure”. 
Figure 7 provides another example of poor and better treatment of human error on bow ties. 
a) Poor Treatment 
 
b) Better Treatment 
 
Figure 7. Example 2 Poor and Better Treatment of Human Error in Bow Tie 
Defining Human and Organizational Factors in Bow ties  
In Bow Ties in Risk Management two approaches to bow ties are presented: a conventional 
approach (standard bow tie) and a more advanced multi-level approach (multi-level bow tie). The 
multi-level approach is a new approach and offers potential benefits in addressing additional 
analysis of HOF. Multi-level bow ties can be a better approach to exploring human failure aspects 
in bow ties and can display a range of degradation controls. These would be deeper level controls 
supporting standard bow tie degradation controls against their own degradation. 
In the multi-level approach, the standard bow ties main pathways and degradation factor pathways 
remain unchanged. The extension shows how degradation controls in the standard bow tie can be 
degraded and the additional controls that might be needed. This is shown in Figure 8. This extra 
level is defined as extension level 1. Degradation control examples at the standard bow tie level 
might include: procedures reviewed and up-to-date, training, and supervision; while extension 
level degradation controls might include: drug and alcohol testing, stop work authority, and senior 
management tours. 
 
Figure 8. Concept of Multi-Level Bow Tie Approach (CCPS & EI, 2018) 
Quality Checks 
CCPS/EI identifies many matters to check, post workshop, in order that the final bow ties are 
useful and structurally correct. The list includes overall checks for items including consistent 
terminology, the right mix of people in the workshop and consistency with the agreed study terms 
of reference. There are several other quality checks for items pertaining to the bow elements 
themselves; for example, is the hazard clearly expressed with sufficient data or do all the main 
pathway barriers meet the validity criteria.  
Conclusion 
The bow tie method is a qualitative risk analysis method addressing major accident events and the 
key barriers and safeguards used to manage these.  The method is growing in use in the process 
industries, for both upstream and downstream petro-chemical industries, as well as other major 
hazard industries such as aviation, railways, and shipping.  A bow tie can be a very powerful 
communication tool. The ease of communication can mislead users to think that bow tie creation 
is also easy. CCPS along with the Energy Institute, collaborated to provide a book that compiles 
current practices and provides a set of suggested approaches. 
One of the primary goals of the book is to ensure consistent application of the bow tie technique 
by defining structural elements together with good and poor examples for clarification. This paper 
set out to highlight some of the common errors for the eight bow tie elements. The hazard should 
be specific and link to the top event. Typical top events include loss of containment or loss of 
control. Consequences should be described as ‘[Damage] due to [Event]’. Threats should have a 
direct causation and be specific. A majority of the mistakes are realized when defining barriers. A 
barrier must be effective, independent and auditable. Each individual barrier must have the 
capability to completely stop the threat from leading to the top event, or if a mitigation barrier, 
significantly reduce or eliminate the consequence. HOF has often been poorly treated in current 
bow ties. The book recommends that human failure should not be used as a main pathway threat.  
Multi-level bow ties were introduced as a method to better approach to exploring human failure 
aspects in bow ties and can display a range of degradation controls.  
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